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ANTITRUST LAW
SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS
SCM Corp. v. FTC
The interlocking directorate is a practice which involves the
sharing of common directors by two or more corporations.' In an
effort to combat the anticompetitive effect of interlocks among com-
peting corporations, Congress, in 1914, enacted section 8 of the
Clayton Act 2 which provides that "[n]o person at the same time
' Interlocking directorates have long been thought to foster anticompetitive practices.
See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 15657, MAY 6, 1914, H.R. REP.
No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9, at 19-20 (1914) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY
AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sees. (1913) [hereinafter cited as Pujo
REPORT]; HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF UNrrE STATES STEEL
CORP., H.R. REP. No. 1127, 62d Cong., 2d Sees. (1912) [hereinafter cited as STANLEY
REPORT]. Directorates may be linked by various configurations. See notes 36-41 infra. The
Clayton Act, however, regulates only horizontal interlocks which occur directly between
competing corporations. Some commentators have argued that it is only horizontal interlocks
that pose a genuine threat to competition. Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relation-
ships Be Subject To Regulation And, If So, What Kind?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 347-49 (1976).
See also notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra. Several studies have documented the
widespread existence of interlocks, most of which are not susceptible of enforcement under §
8 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT (Comm. Print
1965) [hereinafter cited as INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT]; FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIS-
SION, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.R. Doc. No. 652, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951)
[hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. See also DIsCLosURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, S. Doc.
No. 93-62, 93d Cong., 2d Sees. (1974).
2 Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act, a series of congressional investigations had
highlighted the anticompetitive effects of interlocking directorates in major industries. As
early as 1887, Congress investigated the railroad industry, uncovering serious anticompetitive
abuses in the areas of construction and repair contracts and leases. These abuses were attrib-
uted to a system of interlocking directorates among the parties to the various contracts.
PACIFIC RAILWAY COMMISSION, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 51, 50th Cong., lst Sees. (1887). In 1912,
interlocking directorates in the steel industry were investigated and similar anticompetitive
effects were documented. See STANLEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 209-10, reprinted in Halver-
son, supra note 1, at 344 n.17.
The problem became a matter of public concern, and by 1912 at least one political party
was calling for the enactment of criminal penalties to prevent corporate interlocks. K. PORTER
& D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956 169 (1956). In a series of articles, Justice
Louis Brandeis focused public attention on the "money trust," a group of powerful and
wealthy individuals who controlled large segments of the economy through the device of
interlocking directorates. Brandeis, Breaking the Money Trusts, HARPERS WEEKLY, Nov. 22,
1913, at 10; id., Nov. 29, 1913, at 9; id., Dec. 6, 1913, at 13; id., Dec. 13, 1913, at 10; id., Dec.
20, 1913, at 10; id., Dec. 27, 1913, at 18; id., Jan. 3, 1914, at 11; id., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18; id.,
Jan. 17, 1914, at 18. Justice Brandeis concluded that interlocks were "the most potent instru-
ment of the money trust." Id., Dec. 6, 1913, at 13.
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shall be a director in any two or more [competing] corporations"
if the elimination of competition between them would violate any
of the antitrust laws.3 Although the statute appears to require com-
pliance by the individual director only, in SCM Corp. v. FTC,4 a
case of first impression, a unanimous Second Circuit panel held that
the statute imposes an affirmative duty on corporations as well.5
From 1967 to 1975, Richard C. Bond had been a member of the
board of directors of both SCM Corporation and Kraftco Corpora-
tion, competitors within the packaged food industry. Alleging a
In response to a growing public concern, President Woodrow Wilson, in his 1914 message
to Congress, requested a law which would
effectually prohibit and prevent. . . interlockings of the personnel of the directo-
rates of great corporations. . . as in effect result in making those who borrow and
those who lend practically one and the same, those who sell and those who buy but
the same persons trading with one another under different names and in different
combinations, and those who affect to compete in fact partners and masters of some
whole field of business.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, reprinted in Halverson, Interlocking Directo-
rates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, 21
ViLL. L. Rav. 393, 398 (1975) (emphasis in original). President Wilson's request was subse-
quently incorporated in two bills which were ultimately enacted with some modifications. See
51 CONG. Rac. 2142 (1914); note 34 infra.
3 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). Following an early period of public interest in interlocks, see note
2 supra, there was a lull in enforcement activity until 1947, when the Department of Justice
announced the results of a survey concerning interlocks and indicated that it would seek
voluntary resignations of offenders. See Kramer, Interlocking Directorships And The Clayton
Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266, 1270-71 (1950). The technique of securing voluntary
compliance, known as "jawboning," proved largely successful. Section 8, however, has been
the subject of very little litigation. In fact, from 1914 to 1965, the Department of Justice
instituted only 10 suits to enforce § 8. INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 1,
at 227. In addition, 13 § 8 complaints were filed by the FTC during this period, although 12
of these were dismissed when the offending director resigned. Id. The first major attempt to
enforce § 8 in the courts was in 1952 when the Department of Justice instituted four suits
under the statute. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 112 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on
other grounds, 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (three cases consolidated); United States v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Manage-
ment And The Antitrust Laws, 46 Tax. L. RaV. 819, 820, 821 n.8 (1968).
In recent years there has been a shift away from voluntary compliance toward formal
settlements directed at corporate as well as individual conduct. See, e.g., In re General Elec.
Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,436 (1973). Since 1972,
corporations generally have been required to accept formal consent agreements, even when
the interlock was terminated voluntarily. In re Kraftco Corp., 89 F.T.C. 46, 53 & n.20 (1977).
Additionally, the FTC has been imposing reporting requirements on corporations as a means
of further broadening their responsibility to avoid participation in anticompetitive interlocks.
Id.; see In re Aluminum Co. of America, 82 F.T.C. 1819 (1973); In re Aluminum Co. of
America, 82 F.T.C. 1814 (1973).
565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), vacating and remanding 89 F.T.C. 46 (1977).
565 F.2d at 811.
Id. at 809. Both corporations sold margarine, barbecue sauce and edible oils. In 1975,
SCM sold $83 million worth of these items in the competitive market, while Kraftco's sales
were approximately $258 million. Id.
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violation of section 8, the FTC filed a complaint against Bond,
Kraftco and SCM. 7 Shortly thereafter, Bond resigned from the
board of directors of SCM, and both Bond and Kraftco consented
to the entry of a cease and desist order.' SCM, however, answered
the FTC's complaint by arguing that section 8 was not applicable
to corporations.9 Rejecting this contention, the Administrative Law
Judge determined that SCM had violated section 8 and that a cease
and desist order was justified. 10 The FTC affirmed on appeal," and
SCM filed a petition for review in the Second Circuit.
2
Judge Feinberg3 began his analysis by observing that, since the
statute's application to corporations was not clear from its face," it
was necessary to address the policy considerations underlying its
enactment.5 The court noted that section 8 was "prophylactic" and
was designed" 'to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust
laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such violations
through interlocking directorates.' ,,, Therefore, the narrow con-
I[d.
Id. When the FTC discovers an alleged violation of § 8, it may proceed in one of two
ways. Where time and the public interest permit, the FTC may afford an alleged offender an
opportunity to submit a proposed consent settlement for consideration by the Commission.
16 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (1978). A consent order issued pursuant to an accepted proposed settle-
ment has the same force and effect as a cease and desist order. Id. § 2.32. Alternatively, the
FTC may proceed with a formal complaint. Id. §§ 3.1-.72. Effective Aug. 22, 1977, the FTC
abolished its voluntary compliance procedure whereby it could accept promises of alleged
offenders to discontinue the questioned practices. FTC News Release of September 13, 1977.
See aLso 42 Fed. Reg. 42195 (1977).
565 F.2d at 809.
I' Id.
89 F.T.C. 46, 60 (1977).
565 F.2d at 809. Appeals from final determinations of the FTC are taken directly to
the court of appeals. The appellant may seek review in either the circuit within which the
violation occurred or the circuit within which the appellant resides or carries on business. 15
U.S.C. § 21(c) (1976).
' Circuit Judges Moore and Mulligan joined in the opinion.
" 565 F.2d at 811. The court also noted a dearth of prior authority on the question and
remarked that the absence of reported decisions under § 8 might have been the result of the
government's past reliance on administrative measures to enforce the statute. Id. at 810; see
note 3 and accompanying text supra. In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 634
n.9 (1953), the issue of § 8's scope was expressly left open by the Supreme Court. In United
States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., [1952-19531 TRADE CAS. (CCH) T 67,561 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
however, District Judge Weinfeld held that § 8 is broad enough to reach the corporation as
well as the individual director. Judge Weinfeld reasoned that "[tihe violation . . . [isl
committed by the individual defendant in accepting membership on the Boards of Directors
of both corporations and by [the corporate defendant] in acquiescing therein over an ex-
tended period of years." Id. at 68,668.
' 565 F.2d at 810-11.
Id. at 811 (quoting United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1953)); see In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa.
1973); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), quoted in LEIS LAivE REFERENCE: SERVICE
[Vol. 53:234
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struction of section 8 proposed by SCM would undermine this pol-
icy, since the unpunished corporation could maintain the interlock
indefinitely by replacing each ousted board member with another
interlocking director. 7
In addition to the policy considerations supporting a broad
reading of section 8, the SCM court took note of the relationship
between section 8 and section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, which pro-
vides that, upon determining that any person has violated section
8, the FTC "shall issue. . . an order requiring such person to...
rid itself of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions . . . of
[this Act]. ' ' 18 This language, the court observed, indicated that
section 8 was intended to reach corporations, since only a corpora-
tion can "rid itself' of a director. 9
Turning his attention to the legislative history of section 8,
Judge Feinberg suggested that language in the House Report indi-
cated that the drafters intended the paragraph in section 8 dealing
with industrial corporations 2 to impose restraints upon corporations
as well as directors. 2' In addition, the court determined that Con-
OF THE LBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM: FIFTY-SIx YEARS OF
ANTrrRusT DEVELOPMENT, 1900-1956 60 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESS AND THE MONOP-
OLY PROBLEM].
'7 565 F.2d at 810 (quoting 89 F.T.C. 46, 63 (1977)).
" 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976).
565 F.2d at 811. Judge Feinberg rejected SCM's contention that § 11(b) was merely
procedural and that the "rid itself' language was only a "vestigial remainder" of the original
version of § 8, which expressly prohibited banking corporations from having interlocked
directorates. Id.; see Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 8, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). This express prohibition
was eliminated in 1935. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, § 329, 49 Stat. 717.
The court's position is supported by basic tenets of construction which suggest that parts
of a statute should be construed consistently, see Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S.
480, 488-89 (1947), and that, where possible, no part should be denied effect, Ex Parte Public
Nat'l Bank, 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928). The "rid itself" language in § 11(b), however, could be
regarded as merely one of several tools available to the FTC to remedy a violation of § 8. At
least one commentator has advanced a similar view, arguing that § 11(b) only provides an
enforcement tool and does not add any substantive liabilities. See Wilson, Unlocking Inter-
locks: The On-Again Off-Again Saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANTrrRUST L.J. 317,
322 (1976).
20 Although the statute itself does not mention industrial corporations,'the House Report
states that the paragraph in question "deals with the eligibility of directors in industrial
corporations engaged in commerce." HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
21 565 F.2d at 811. The court quoted from that part of the House Report which described
the corporations to which § 8 was to apply: "'This section is divided into three paragraphs,
each of which relates to the particular class of corporations described, and the provisions of
each paragraph are limited in their application to the corporations belonging to the class
named therein.'" 565 F.2d at 811 (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18) (emphasis
added by court). Stressing the "application to corporations" language, Judge Feinberg ap-
pears to have misinterpreted the passage that merely directs that the provisions referring to
industrial corporations govern interlocks among industrial corporations and no others.
1979]
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gress intended the scope of the paragraph relating to industrial cor-
porations to be coextensive with that of a subsequently repealed
paragraph which explicitly prohibited banking corporations from
having interlocked directorates.2 2 Thus, although the paragraph re-
lating to industrial corporations did not precisely state that corpora-
tions were included, an intent to include them could be inferred.3
While concluding that the FTC's interpretation of section 8 was
correct, the court found that the FTC may have applied the wrong
standard governing burden of proof in entering its cease and desist
order against SCM, 24 and, therefore, remanded the case with in-
structions to reconsider in light of the proper standard. 25
2 565 F.2d at 811. The court quoted the following language from the House Report:
In this, as in the preceding paragraph relating to banks, it was not deemed neces-
sary or advisable that interlocking directorates should be prohibited between the
smaller industrial corporations. . .The concentration of wealth, money, and prop-
erty in the United States under the control and in the hands of a few individuals
or great corporations has grown to such an extent ....
Id. (quoting Housa REPORT, supra note 1, at 19) (emphasis added by court).
1 565 F.2d at 811.
21 In its decision to issue an injunction against SCM despite the resignation of the board
member in question, the FTC stated that "the violation is itself the best evidence of the
possibility of future such occurrences, and that the burden rests with respondent to demon-
strate that violations will not recur before consideration may be given to omitting an order."
In re Kraftco Corp., 89 F.T.C. 46, 66 (1977) (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 633 (1953)). The Second Circuit, however, concluded that the FTC had confused the
issue of mootness with the question of the propriety of issuing an injunction. It is true that,
where the offending director has resigned, the § 8 action may be mooted if the defendant bears
the burden of showing that there is no possibility of recurrence. 565 F.2d at 812; see United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Even if the defendant cannot meet this
heavy burden, however, an injunction may not be granted unless the party seeking relief
demonstrates that "there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation." Id. While
recognizing that the distinction was a subtle one, Judge Feinberg nevertheless stated that the
differences in the distribution of the burden of proof should not be entirely obliterated. 565
F.2d at 812.
At least one commentator has noted that the proof necessary to establish "a cognizable
danger of recurrent violation" remains uncertain. Travers, supra note 3, at 822; see, e.g.,
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1953); United States v. Newmont
Mining Co., 34 F.R.D. 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
565 F.2d at 813. As an alternate ground for reversal, SCM argued that it had been
unlawfully discriminated against because the FTC's complaint of June, 1975 had been issued
under a formal procedure, although the FTC previously had enforced § 8 through informal
measures. See note 8 supra. The court, however, refused to adopt the view that discrimination
existed merely because SCM was one of the first to be subjected to the new formal complaint
procedure. Id. at 814. Indeed, the FTC is not even obliged "to start simultaneous suits against
all alleged offenders." Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1975). See also FTC
v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1967); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S.
411, 413 (1958).
SCM also contended that the substantial differences between the consent decree entered
into by Kraftco and the cease and desist order entered against it violated the constitutional
guarantee of due process. 565 F.2d at 814. The court found it unnecessary to reach the
question whether an unexplained difference would pose due process problems, since it found
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Clearly, corporations with interlocking boards could use their
common directors to influence business policy and restrain competi-
tive activity.26 Anticompetitive effects are particularly likely to
emerge when a common director is required to vote on a business
policy which is necessary or favorable to one of the competitors but
inimical to the interests of the other. Section 8, which has been held
to establish a per se rule of law,2 was intended to prevent such
effects by automatically proscribing certain interlocks, whether or
not they actually are proved harmful to competition. In holding that
corporations are punishable under section 8, the Second Circuit has
enlarged the scope of the statute in an apparent effort to strengthen
the impact of the section and promote its enforcement. In this re-
spect, the SCM decision is consistent with the general purpose of
the Clayton Act to alleviate potential threats to competition by
"[arresting] the creation of trusts . . . in their incipiency. ' ' 29
There is a surprising inconsistency, however, between the ap-
parently broad deterrent purpose of the statute and the actual limi-
tations inherent in its language. The plain wording of section 8
seems to restrict its prohibition to those "persons"-natural or cor-
the disparity between the Kraftco settlement and the SCM order neither "arbitrary [nior
irrational in light of the facts before the FTC." Id. The court also noted that the FTC has
broad discretion in fashioning remedies for anticompetitive practices. Id. at 814; see FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385,
392 (1959); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S.
608, 611 (1946); Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
818 (1976). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, as long as an order is reasonably
related to the proscribed practices, it should be upheld. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S.
419, 428 (1957); Hoving Corp. v. FTC, 290 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1961). For the criteria used in
determining whether an administrative procedure violates due process, see Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
26 It has been argued that no hard evidence of actual trade restraints has emerged as a
result of governmental investigations of interlocking directorates. Halverson, supra note 2,
at 394 & n.4; Wilson, supra note 19, at 329. While theories of adverse anticompetitive effect
have been advanced, see, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 23; Halverson, supra note 2, at
400 n.33, adverse economic impact has not been demonstrated. One commentator has even
suggested that the benefits of certain interlocking directorates may outweigh any potential
abuses. Wilson, supra note 19, at 329. But see notes 39-40 infra.
2 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The
Sears defendant contended that it could be held liable for a violation of § 8 only if a merger
between the interlocked corporations would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976). 111 F. Supp. at 616. The court, however, declined to accept this position, holding
instead that if any hypothetical agreement would violate any of the antitrust laws, the
interlock is prohibited. Id. at 621.
z, See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
2 CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM, supra note 16, at 60 (quoting S. REP. No. 698,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914)). The Clayton Act was enacted to strengthen the Sherman Act.
United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); S. REP. No.
698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
19791
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porate-who serve on the boards of competing corporations.3 1 While
the SCM court's construction of section 8 in light of the language
in section 11(b) is plausible, it is submitted that a closer examina-
tion of the statute's legislative, political and economic history would
yield a different result.'
A major premise of the proponents of anti-interlock legislation
was that no one person could effectively manage the affairs of more
than one large corporation. 32 In fact, among the stated objectives
underlying the enactment of section 8 were inducing corporate
directors to concentrate their responsibilities and avoid positions of
conflicting interest, and creating the opportunity for others to rise
to high level management positions.33 This legislative focus on the
activities of directors, it is submitted, is entirely consistent with a
narrow construction of section 8.
Moreover, contrary to the view taken by the SCM court, it does
not appear that section 8 was intended as an all-encompassing solu-
tion to the problem of corporate interlocks. The final measure which
- 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). Under the "deputization" theory, a corporation theoretically
could violate § 8 if it placed officers on the boards of competing corporations with the
intention that the officers act as corporate agents. This theory, however, has not yet been
addressed directly by the courts. See United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699,
711-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd without opinion, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975), consent decree
entered, [1975-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) $] 60,611 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Halverson, supra note 2, at
403-04; Wilson, supra note 19, at 323.
1' When statutory language is ambiguous, resort to legislative history is justified. United
States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); see United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S.
59, 62 (1963); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151 (1958); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d
844, 849 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d
320, 325 (2d Cir. 1976). Political and economic background is particularly helpful in the
construction of remedial measures such as the antitrust laws. 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAws AND TRADE REGULATION § 10.01 (1978) (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318-19 (1897)); see United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221 (1952); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 F. 961, 965 (8th Cir. 1905); E. CRAWFORD,
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 247-48 (1940).
32 See BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY ch. X, at 201-02 (1914); Douglas, Directors Who
Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1305 (1934); Kramer, supra note 3, at 1275.
3 Kramer, supra note 3, at 1270. In his 1914 message to Congress, President Wilson
stated that a ban on interlocks would "bring new men, new energies, a new spirit of initiative,
new blood, into the management of our great business enterprises." HOUSE REPORT, supra note
1, at 18 (quoting President Wilson's January 20, 1914 message to Congress). This theme was
also adopted by the drafters of the bill, who stated:
[Tihe adoption of the provisions of this section will bring new men, new energies,
new spirit of initiative, and new blood into the management of our business enter-
prises. It will open the field of industrial development and origination to scores of
men who have been obliged to serve when their abilities entitled them to direct. It
will immensely hearten the young men coming on and will greatly enrich the busi-
ness activities of the whole country.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
[Vol. 53:234
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emerged from the legislative process was a considerably diluted ver-
sion of the strong bill supported by proponents of vigorous antitrust
enforcement. 34 Interlocks were prohibited only in three specific in-
dustries,35 and some forms of interlocks were left entirely unregu-
lated." Despite subsequent attempts to amend the statute, section
8 remains riddled with loopholes.37 For example, since section 8
proscribes interlocks only when competing corporations share com-
mon directors, interlocks may be effected lawfully through stock-
holders, officers or other emnployees of the corporation.38 Section 8
3' The original Clayton bill, H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), was referred to the
House Judiciary Committee, which amended § 8 to cover only those corporations with
$1,000,000 in capital, surplus or undivided profits. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1. The
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the provisions containing criminal sanctions for viola-
tions of § 8, preferring instead to rely on FTC enforcement. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914). The criminal sanctions were not revived in legislative conference. See S. Doc.
No. 586, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The bill finally was signed into law by President Wilson
along with the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), on October 15,
1914. 2 J. VON KALNOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE RFGULATION § 10.03 [21 (1978).
Senator Reed, a supporter of a strong bill, characterized the final product as follows: "When
the Clayton Bill was first written, it was a raging lion with a mouth full of teeth. It has
degenerated to a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive meow and an anemic appearance." 61
CONG. REc. 15,819 (1914).
1 The only three categories of corporations affected by the Clayton Act's provisions on
interlocks were common carriers under § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976), banking institutions under
§ 8, id. § 19, and industrial corporations under § 8, id.
' See Wilson, supra note 19, at 319-20; notes 38-40 infra.
11 See Halverson, supra note 2, at 398-99 & n.25; Kramer, supra note 3, at 1271-74;
Travers, supra note 3, at 822-24; Wilson, supra note 19, at 326. See generally Hearings on
Corporate Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures
and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 897-912 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Corporate Disclosure]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 2, at 21, 26-46 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Monopoly Power]; Panel Discussion, Unlocking Interlocks:
The On-Again Off-Again Saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANrnrRUsT L.J. 315, 315-54
(1976). There has been disagreement among the commentators concerning the need to enact
remedial legislation to supplement § 8. See Halverson, supra note 2, at 409 (current legisla-
tion is broad enough to permit regulation of interlocks not proscribed by § 8 when facts of
particular case so require); Kramer, supra note 3, at 1274-75 (additional legislation should
be seriously considered to remedy defects in § 8); Travers, supra note 3, at 863-64 (legislation
is required to close some loopholes while others should be left as is).
11 The operation of this "loophole" is aptly illustrated by the testimony of former FTC
Chairman Mead before the House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power:
[Sleveral years ago the board of directors of General Steel Castings contained the
president and two vice-presidents of American Steel Foundries, all of whom were
also directors of the latter company and also contained the chairman of the board
and the president of Baldwin Locomotive, both of whom were also directors of that
company. When the Department of Justice questioned these interlocking directo-
rates, the directors from American Steel Foundries and Baldwin withdrew from the
General Steel Castings board. There is a catch. Their place was taken by two vice-
presidents of Baldwin Locomotive, but since none of these officials was a director
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also fails to address vertical 9 and indirect interlocks,0 as well as the
interlocking of potential competitors.4 Thus, since section 8 was
drafted to regulate only a limited class of interlocks,42 it is not un-
realistic to assume that Congress meant to similarly limit the class
of persons against whom the statute was to be enforced.13
The view that section 8 was intended as a limited, piecemeal
reform measure, rather than a sweeping prohibition on corporate
interlocks, is also supported by recent legislative developments.
in any of these companies but General Steel Castings, the new arrangement satis-
fied the requirements of Section 8 of the Clayton Act. There is no reason to believe
that the closeness of the executive and policymaking ties between the three compa-
nies was in any way reduced by the change.
Hearings on Monopoly Power, supra note 37, at 28.
.1 Vertical interlocks occur when companies in a vertical market relationship such as
manufacturer-customer, supplier-customer, or creditor institution-credit customer, are
linked by a common director. Turner, Interlocks-A Legislative View, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 331,
335 (1976). See generally Travers, supra note 3, at 851-61.
Vertical interlocks are quite prevalent today. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1. See gener-
ally INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 1. Moreover, studies reveal that such
interlocks may be vehicles for potentially serious anticompetitive practices. See SUtCOMM. ON
REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT, SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CORPO-
RATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, S. Doc. No. 94-246, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter
cited as METCALF SUBCOMM.]; FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. Various observers who have
assessed the significance of vertical interlocks disagree on what, if anything, should be done
to curtail them. See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 2, at 406 (vertical interlocks causing
"identifiable anticompetitive effects" must be dissolved); Kessler & Stern, Competition,
Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 24-26 (1959) (vertical interlocks are not
injurious to competition and should not be proscribed); Travers, supra note 3, at 864 (outright
ban on vertical interlocks is too severe, but competitive bidding might be required in certain
situations).
10 Indirect interlocks occur where two or more competing or potentially competitive
companies which do not share common directors are linked through a third entity. For
example, competing companies may have directors or other employees acting as directors in
a third company. Alternatively, a lending institution may have directors on the boards of
several competing companies. Turner, supra note 39, at 335. Such indirect interlocks are also
widespread. It has been observed that interlocking relationships among manufacturers and
financial institutions constitute the most significant network of indirect interlocks. FTC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
As in the case of vertical interlocks, observers differ on the question whether additional
legislation is required to limit indirect interlocks. See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 1, at 349;
Travers, supra note 3, at 863-64.
Travers, supra note 3, at 823.
32 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1; notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
13 Contrary to the conclusion of the SCM court, see notes 20-23 and accompanying text
supra, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress intended the specific
prohibition on interlocks among banking corporations, see note 19 supra, to apply to in-
dustrial corporations. The passage from the House Report relied on by the court, see note 22
supra, demonstrates only that the provision limiting § 8's reach to larger enterprises was
intended to apply to industrial corporations as well as banking corporations. Nothing in the
quoted language suggests that the statutory proscriptions regarding the conduct of industrial
corporation directors was intended to extend to the corporations themselves.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
Cognizant of the limitations inherent in section 8, 4 4 several legisla-
tors have made unsuccessful efforts to broaden the coverage of the
statute.4 5 At least one bill would have expressly included corpora-
tions within the scope of section 8.11 Thus, it appears that Congress
was aware of the interlock threat in 1914, chose to deal with the
problem in a restrictive and selective manner then, is still aware of
the potential anticompetitive effect of interlocks, and has continued
to demonstrate its intent to restrict enforcement to certain specified
areas.
Such a conclusion, however, does not suggest that the govern-
ment is precluded from seeking relief against an offending corpora-
tion. 7 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)48
empowers the FTC to reach corporations when they participate in
interlocks that are inimical to the spirit as well as the letter of the
antitrust laws, 49 even if the offense could not have been reached
under section 8.11 In addition, the government can reach interlocks
" See, e.g., METCALF SuBcoMm., supra note 39; Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra
note 37, pt. 3, at 168-75; INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 1; Hearings on
Monopoly Power, supra note 37, at 26-46.
is See, e.g., H.R. 4406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 14997, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); H.R. 13581, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 2346, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.
2509, 90th Cong., lst Seas. (1965). None of these bills was reported out of committee.
11 H.R. 11110, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(2)(2) (1975), reprinted in Halverson, supra note
1, at 341 n.1. According to the office of Congresswoman Chisholm, a co-sponsor of the bill,
no action was taken on H.R. 11110 and the bill died in committee. Telephone conversation
with Mrs. Doren, New York Office of Congresswoman Chisholm, October 31, 1978.
I? At least one court has stated that regardless of whether § 8 applies to corporations, if
the court deemed injunctive relief necessary to prevent future violations of the statute, it
could enjoin the corporations as well as the individual directors pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1976). United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 705-06 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 76-3614 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1976).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Unfair methods of competition in. . . commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in . . . commerce, are declared unlawful.
(6) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships or corporations. . . , from using unfair methods of competition in. . . com-
merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . . commerce.
4, FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); 6 J.
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION § 39.05[51 (1978); Halverson, supra
note 2, at 404. In Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), the court held that,
although the applicable provision of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976), does not cover illegal conduct by a buyer,
the buyer may be reached under § 5 of the FTCA. 300 F.2d at 99. In general, the courts have
given the FTC great latitude to protect competition under § 5 of the FTCA.
- FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); see FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233 (1972); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Fashion
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which are part of a conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade
through the provisions of the Sherman Act.'
In conclusion, the Second Circuit's holding in SCM strengthens
the Clayton Act by placing an affirmative duty on corporations to
avoid interlocks proscribed by section 8. The legislative history,
however, suggests that section 8 was a narrowly drawn statute de-
signed to place the burden of compliance on the individual director
rather than the corporation.2 It therefore appears that, in stressing
the remedial and prophylactic purposes of the statute, the SCM
court has expanded the scope of section 8 beyond its permissible
boundaries. Admittedly, the tension between the preventive pur-
pose'13 of the statute and the practices and parties 4 left unregulated
by its terms is difficult to reconcile. Much of this tension, however,
is eliminated when section 8 of the Clayton Act is considered in
conjunction with section 5 of the FTCA, which provides an alterna-
tive vehicle for penalizing conduct that is injurious to the competi-
tive market system. 5  It is submitted that, in the face of Congress'
continuing refusal to amend section 8 to broaden its scope, section
5 of the FTCA must be regarded as the exclusive statutory authority
for enforcing the government's anti-interlock policy against corpora-
tions.
Maralynne Flehner
Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291
U.S. 304 (1934); Halverson, supra note 1, at 349; Halverson, supra note 2, at 404.
It has been suggested that supporters of a strong anti-interlock bill agreed to the weaker
version of § 8, see note 34 supra, because they believed that interlocks not covered by the
statute could be reached under § 5 of the FTCA as unfair methods of competition. Travers,
supra note 3, at 831-32. Professor Travers argues that President Wilson initially favored a
strong, specifically defined Clayton Act and a weak regulatory commission, but later redi-
rected his efforts toward establishing a strong regulatory commission. Id. at 831. Professor
Travers also notes: "It is. . . clear that Congress did not want to include any other interlocks
under the rigid prohibition of section 8; it is not clear, however, that Congress deliberately
refused to change section 8 because it wished to exclude all other interlocks from antitrust
coverage." Id. at 832 (footnote omitted). This view is supported by S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1914), which states: "The Committee was of the opinion that it would be better
to put in a general provision condemning unfair competition than to attempt to define the
numerous unfair practices, such as local price cutting, interlocking directorates, and holding
companies intended to restrain substantial competition." See generally Oppenheim, Guides
to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1961); Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act as Antitrust: A Comment, 47 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1967).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976); see Kramer, supra note 3, at 1272 n.26; Travers, supra note
3, at 821 & n.10.
2, See notes 32-43 and accompanying text supra.
: See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 35-43 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
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